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The dimensions defined by the opposition between madness and reason and by this 
opposition’s uncanny double—the disciplinary conflict between history and 
philosophy—do not of course alone determine even the most general discursive 
situation within which the phenomenon of the “borderline personality disorder” 
appears.  The opposition between reason and madness is doubled and shadowed also by 
that between reason and religion, which increasingly assumes during the nineteenth 
century the more positivist form of a debate between science and religion.    
Unreason therefore assumes in modernity the form not just of madness but also 
of faith qua religious faith, or more generally irrationally grounded persuasion.1  After 
all, the period of the “great confinement,” the seventeenth century, is the period not 
just of French neo-classicism but also of the Reformation’s consolidation, the Thirty 
Years War, and the Treaty of Westfalia (1648).  This treaty can be said to “confine” 
religion when it confirms the principle of the subordination of church to state, radically 
inverting the medieval European theopolitical order.  With the establishment of absolute 
monarchy, the seventeenth century thus unwittingly prepares the stage for 
Enlightenment discourses of bourgeois tolerance (the insane “asylum” of religion being 
the private sphere such tolerance posits as sacrosanct).2  And it is certainly not by 
chance that the subordination of religious irrationality to the rationality of absolutist 
raison d’état roughly coincides in time with the “great confinement” of unreason.   The 
privatization of religion (through separation of church and state) that follows the 
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development of Enlightenment reason extends this exclusionary confinement of 
unreason and draws its first set of consequences.  Enlightenment “tolerance” 
simultaneously condemns religious irrationality to a kind of “house arrest”  (or to the 
religious “don’t ask don’t tell” policy of liberal modernity as secularization) and thereby 
ensures future repeated returns of irrationalism as naturalizing-universalizing 
politicizations of private delusion.  In short, these complex developments of the modern 
opposition between public reason (which takes philosophical and scientific forms) and 
private religion, which are subject to manifold reversals in various irrationalisms and 
totalitarianisms—romantic medievalisms, fascist national myths, religious 
fundamentalisms—from the late eighteenth to the twenty-first centuries, parallel and at 
points intersect with the development of the modern opposition between reason and 
madness (or scientific rationality and mental illness).  While Foucault takes them to 
some extent into account, he has difficulty doing them “justice,” as his perhaps 
somewhat naïve reception of the Iranian Revolution illustrates.3   But of course, the 
global rebirth of fundamentalisms did not occur before his eyes in the increasingly 
paroxysmal clarity with which it demonstrated itself on the world stage in the decades 
after his death in 1984.  
Two aspects of this very complex history of the modern subordination of 
religion to reason need to be underlined for the sake of the present context.  First, the 
ideological tension between scientific rationality and religion deadlocks the 
methodological debates about the figure of the “borderline”—and about 
psychopathology more generally—in two principal directions simultaneously.  On the 
one hand, that which bases itself in subjectivity (or “affect”) and can thus be branded as 
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“non-scientific”—as often with Freud in recent decades, needless to say—immediately 
appears to be a mere private faith illegitimately laying claim to shared, public recognition.  
On the other hand, what is recognized as “scientific rationality” is automatically 
disqualified from generating statements about the interior states—by definition the 
religious sphere of private values—indifference to which is the very precondition of its 
recognition as “scientific.”   Hence, the attraction of behaviorisms, genetic determinisms, 
and physicalist reductions of various sorts, including the neurophysiological and perhaps 
in some instances the linguistic.  The result is tendentially an aporetic inaccessibility of 
the limit between these two positions, and hence of their structuring interrelationship, to 
analysis from either position.  All of “us”—i.e. the various psychoanalytic, psychiatric, 
psychological, and humanities discourses (and the divergent theoretical positions within 
these) that thematize the “borderline”—have to situate ourselves and our friends and 
opponents nolens volens in the oscillations between these two positions—science and 
religion (as illusion or delusion)—both of which are defined around the borderline 
between them, a limit that both in principle exclude.4 
Second, the undecidability of the status of discourses as scientific and non-
scientific—an undecidability that results from their historical (and repetitive) origination 
out of the splitting apart of reason and unreason—is accompanied in our epoch by a 
broad questioning of the privatization of religion, a resurgent mass desire to “return” to 
a world in which private and public are reconciled in a higher unity.  Obviously, we live 
in a moment in which the claims of the irrational on public life and public discourse have 
recently renewed themselves with ferocious force.  These developments signal a 
global “crisis”—a globalization “crisis,” no doubt—in the management of the irrational: 
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an increasingly pervasive uncertainty about where reason ends and unreason begins, and 
about how to make sense of their relationship.  The figure of the “borderline” (by which 
I mean both the individuals who end up falling under this designation and the theory that 
undergirds it) is a participant in, and a plaything of, the struggles to which this 
uncertainty gives rise.  Indeed, it is not by chance that the prevalence and visibility of the 
“borderline” as a diagnostic phenomenon comes about after World War II in the 
context of an Anglo-American renewal of secularism, and thus of the reassertion of the 
separation of rational from irrational, sane from insane.5   How, then, does the 
historically sedimented opposition between scientific and non-scientific discourses, 
together with those between reason and madness, reason and religion, structure the 
discussion of the borderline in the following contributions ?  
I begin with the context of the articles by Apollon and his colleagues, Bergeron, 
Cantin, and Simonis.  The critical engagement of psychoanalysis with science (and 
especially neurophysiologically based psychiatry) that extends itself across these 
otherwise diverse pieces is not just a theoretical response to the abstract relationship 
between these two terms, but arises out of a very specific situation of struggle in 
Quebec City, where these analysts work.   The psychoanalysts of GIFRIC (Groupe 
interdisciplinaire freudien de recherches et d’interventions cliniques et culturelles), who 
founded in 1982 and have run since then the publicly supported Psychoanalytic Center 
for the Treatment of Psychoses in Quebec City, were engaged from 2001 until 2009 in 
conflict with the hospital with which the Center was linked, the Centre hospitalier 
Robert-Giffard, and the ministry of health.   Biomedical discourse attempted, in this 
case, in accord with the tendency of recent decades, to thrust aside its formerly 
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exemplary companion, psychoanalysis.  This development was foreseen, of course, by 
Freud in The Question of Lay Analysis.6   The difficulty with the disengagement in this 
instance, however, arose from the fact that the Psychoanalytic Center for the 
Treatment of the Psychoses had been wildly successful, in the overwhelming view of 
users, their families, the staff, and the independent examination conducted by psychiatric 
personnel in the Canadian government’s employ.   As a result, it has been (thus far) 
impossible for the hospital to prevent GIFRIC from continuing to run the Center it 
established almost 30 years ago.7   This Center for the psychoanalytically informed, 
multidisciplinary treatment of psychoses has for the time being survived a threat to its 
continued existence as an autonomous instance of the application and development of 
Lacanian theory.8   
Yet it needs to be stressed that this struggle did not (or rather does not) simply 
concern the power-relations between the truth-claims (and truth-concepts) of applied 
science (as medical psychiatry) and psychoanalysis (or even Lacanian psychoanalysis) in 
general, but specifically as related to psychosis.  The GIFRIC organization has specifically 
engaged itself—within, and in part against, the tradition of Lacan—to provide something 
akin to what Foucault at times saw in psychoanalysis—a possible “dialogue” between 
reason and madness—although not quite in those terms.  The GIFRIC analysts attempt 
to establish not exactly the “dialogue” between unreason and reason, but rather the 
empty space within the social link where “madness” could speak and express itself, to 
some degree and in some sense, on its own terms.  In this set-up, the analyst 
represents, or is meant to hold open, that empty space.9  
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In short, neurophysiologically informed, medical psychiatry as a discourse has 
been arrayed here, in this perhaps small but significant instance, not just against 
psychoanalysis, but against a particular form of psychoanalysis that claims to give back 
the status of subjectivity and full humanity to the psychotic subjects who otherwise 
appeared on the social scene as dehumanized objects.   The essays by Apollon, 
Bergeron, Cantin, and Simonis all make important statements about, and from, this 
ongoing debate between different forms of reason.  (The history of this struggle can be 
read, in part, online, at www.gifric.com/Quisommesnous.htm.)    
Willy Apollon’s “The Limit: a Fundamental Question for the Subject in the 
Human Experience,” approaches the tension between the “scientific” and “non-
scientific” encounters with the human psyche by situating empirical scientific observation 
in its psychic origin and status.  Apollon indicates this origin at a particular point within a 
theory of child “development,” but he emphasizes that this “development” includes 
what is non-observable, i.e. what eludes and yet contextualizes a strictly objectively 
“scientific” account.  Apollon therefore neither defends psychoanalysis as a “scientific” 
discourse, nor acquiesces to the (dis)qualification of psychoanalysis as “nonscientific.”  
He insists that psychoanalysis presents a knowledge, but one that, while not a matter 
of—either purely private or public—faith, is not accessible to (objective) “science” 
because it remains based on subjective and nonverifiable experience.  Thus, Apollon 
situates scientific knowledge and the experience of observation and nomination within a 
broader range of experience to whose origins and unfolding psychoanalysis would have 
privileged access.  Here psychoanalysis—and the philosophical anthropology that 
emerges in connection with its experience—determines the framing of science, and not 
the other way around.   
Konturen lll (2010) 
 
93 
While respecting both domains in their specificity, Apollon’s argument situates 
scientific observation, on the one hand, and psychoanalytic experience, on the other, in 
two different dimensions of human experience, rather than addressing them principally 
as two different, competing conceptions or philosophies.   These two dimensions are 
comprised of what Apollon calls the “mental image,” as visually perceptual, spatial, and 
nominal experience (what Freud called perception-consciousness), on the one hand, and 
the “mental representation,” on the other hand, which does not, in fact, represent 
anything and is itself nonrepresentable: it is the presentation of the nonpresentable.  The 
internal resonance of this “mental representation ” is not directly observable, for 
Apollon, because it originates in a proto-verbal, audible traumatization by the voice of 
the other, a traumatization that institutes a temporal dimension at once beyond and 
within language.  Observation can grasp only the former, Apollon argues, because it 
belongs to this level of experience, but not the latter, which disturbs it from without like 
(or as) an hallucination—the irrationality or the madness of human being.   The GIFRIC 
analysts posit this irrationality in its universality, understanding it as the very core of the 
human, because it is precisely the dimension of the human spirit (or culture or artifice), 
through which the human exceeds the domain of nature.    
For Apollon, the experience of the “mental image,” as spatial, is a limited 
experience of limits; the experience of the “mental representation,” in contrast, is an 
unlimited experience, or rather an experience of unlimitation and limitlessness.   
According to this rewriting of Kant’s transcendental aesthetics in terms of 
psychoanalytically understood historical a prioris—conditions of the possibility of human 
desire (I return to Kant in the Introduction to the third section of this Special Issue)—
the linguistic and parental context of the mental image is the “mother tongue.”  The 
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mother tongue, however, is ambiguous—not unlike language or borders in general for a 
Derridian discourse—because it combines the audible dimension of the voice with the 
visual dimension of the image, rooting the voice in the image, but also always virtually or 
potentially unsettling the image with the voice, combining situatedness with 
nonsituation, position (i.e. being as spatial positing) with the (nonbeing of the) 
nonpositional, the vocal-temporal as such.  The dimension of the denomination of 
observable things for which the mother tongue is responsible is what Apollon—
distancing himself here from the more usual Lacanian linkage of the symbolic with 
paternal connotations—terms the “symbolic order” as that of “things said,” but an 
order haunted by “things heard,” the hallucinatory dimension of a voice that does not 
correspond to the naming of visible entities.  
In Apollon’s displacement, the paternal function, or the fact of language, adds 
itself to this experience of the mother tongue and displaces it: rules (like names before) 
replace the always enigmatic object of the voice as the principle of spatial order, 
introducing the child into the social bond.  After this point, Apollon introduces the 
problem of the limit in terms of the confrontation between the social sphere of 
limitation and the—in principle unlimited—expansion of interiority.   This confrontation 
passes from the initial negotiations and demands of the adolescent, to the adult’s 
ongoing feud with the limits entailed by the social bond.  Subjectivity appears here in the 
guise of the continuing attempt to express the limitlessness experienced by the subject 
as his/her true self in the ongoing encounter with the voice.  The voice remains 
metaphysical here only in that, although itself a material trauma of “voice-recognition,” it 
gives rise to metaphysical experience.   In the negotiation of the subject with society, 
the subject calculates the passage beyond the limits of the law in terms of safety and the 
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danger of death, i.e. total social isolation, but the calculation is one that subserves a 
survival that is always nolens volens an out-living of oneself.   
The next contribution, Danielle Bergeron’s essay on “The Borders Between 
Autism and Psychosis,” stems likewise from a senior analyst from GIFRIC and the 
Freudian School of Quebec, who happens also to be a psychiatrist.  Nonetheless, she 
has been involved in the same legal and theoretical-clinical struggle as the other 
members of GIFRIC, which has pitted psychiatric “reason ” against psychoanalytic 
“irrationality,” the alleged “scientificity” of the former against the ostensible “non-
scientificity” of the latter.   In this essay, Bergeron proposes a description of the 
subjective structure underlying a diagnostic category that is closely related to psychosis, 
but distinct from the “borderline personality”—autism.   LIke the other essays by 
GIFRIC analysts in this Special Issue (Apollon, Cantin, and Simonis), Bergeron’s analysis 
circumscribes the scientific discourse in terms of observation, understanding scientific 
observation as focused on the mental image (or perception), an image defined by the 
mother tongue and haunted by an audible dimension irreducible to visibility.      
Within this “framework,” Bergeron draws on testimonial literature by autistic 
subjects to argue that autistic subjectivity is structured as an attempt to preserve an 
unmediated relation with the subject’s own “mental representation,” or inner voice(s).  
She understands and respects as a way of being this attempt, rooted in an early and 
unconscious decision or choice, to refuse as much as possible to enter into the mother 
tongue.  The refusal avoids the encounter with an Other, and thereby the encounter 
with an Other’s desire.  Bergeron unfolds the effects of this choice in the autistic 
construction of a space without any Other, and of a language devoid of desire.  In 
contrast, the psychotic subject enters into the mother tongue and finds him/herself 
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struggling with alien voices, with their imperatives, desires, and jouissances.  Finally, as I 
read her, Bergeron implies here that the autistic refusal of the mother tongue, the 
autistic attempt to construct a literalist mother tongue of one’s own, is akin to the 
scientific refusal of the voice within the mother tongue, but that autistic discourse 
differentiates itself from scientific discourse in that science attempts to perfect the 
mother tongue, the determination of the referential universe, while autism attempts to 
withdraw from and evade it.10  
Our third contribution to this section, Alan Bass’s article “Psychoanalytic 
Process, the Paradoxes of Self-Reference and Intermediacy,” adopts a very different 
strategy in its approach to the problematic interrelationship between science and 
psychoanalysis.  Instead of trying to establish the differences between the two fields, Bass 
works to establish a rapprochement.  His attempt goes by way of references to 
contemporary philosophies of science and deconstructive philosophy.  (Bass began his 
career as the translator of major early works by Jacques Derrida, notably Writing and 
Difference, Margins of Philosophy, and The Post-Card: from Socrates to Freud and Beyond, and 
became a training analyst and prominent writer on analysis who has pursued 
connections between the Derridian philosophy of difference, on the one hand, and 
difference as experienced and worked through in the psychoanalytic situation, on the 
other hand.)   The scientific discourses whose compatibility with psychoanalysis Bass 
wants to stress, however, are those based on the Gödelian principles of undecidability 
and paradoxical self-referentiality.  The scientific discourses to which he refers—
neurophysiological reflections on the brain’s self-reflexivity by figures such as Gerald 
Edelman and Roger Penrose—are therefore not the same as those to which Apollon 
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and Bergeron refer, these latter being empirical and applied, “evidence-based ” sciences 
such as contemporary mainstream psychiatry and neurophysiology.  The positions the 
GIFRIC analysts and Bass sketch out are thus, in this respect, apparently but not actually 
opposed to one another.  Yet the different rhetorical, theoretical, and polemical 
strategies they adopt are worthy of note and reflection.    
Bass’s hypothesis is that “the reality of the impersonal process is the reality of 
self-referential, undecidable, intermediate primary narcissism.  When analyst and patient 
meet in what I am deliberately calling this transitional space, repetition makes a 
difference ” (10).  This position—in which Bass stresses that repetition is not simply 
opposed to change, nor death to life, identity to difference—works against the binary 
logic that organizes the conventional oppositions of reason to madness, science to the 
non-scientific, since the classical age and well before.  It attempts to envision a place for 
psychoanalysis in “the strange Platonism of self-referential paradox and the strange 
positivism of undecidability, complementarity, transitional and virtual processes. ”   
The final essay in this section, Yvan Simonis’s “A Way of Comparing Lévi-Strauss 
and Lacan,” contributes to the clarification of the relationship, and borderline, between 
structuralism (represented here synecdochically by Claude Lévi-Strauss), and 
psychoanalysis (as represented by Jacques Lacan).  Simonis—an anthropologist who has 
worked extensively on Lévi-Strauss, as well as a psychoanalyst associated with GIFRIC—
approaches both discourses as “sciences,” but he calls structuralism a “science of the 
evening,” psychoanalysis a “science of the morning.”  What distinguishes the two is a 
different approach to the Real, and thus the act, which is thought to arise out of, or to 
occur on the order of, the Real.  While the structuralist discourse—the “science of the 
evening” (which recalls the Owl of Minerva’s Hegelian flight) presupposes action but only 
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analyzes its effects in terms of the resultant sedimentation of codes, situating the subject 
as a “symbolic function,” psychoanalytic discourse—as a “science of the morning”—
pursues a Real that inscribes itself beyond the “symbolic order,”  as a non-representable 
and absent cause of the desiring subject.  (The “symbolic order,” of course, is a term 
and concept that Lacan initially derived largely from Lévi-Strauss’s work on the 
elementary structures of kinship and related topics, but Lacan’s later focus on the Real 
pushes him beyond the limits of his mid-career, structuralist phase in which the focus of 
his work was on the “ symbolic.”)   Structuralism is thus akin to the observational 
sciences, as characterized by Apollon, Bergeron, and Cantin, in that it limits its interest 
to the representable “realities” and “possibilities” of the Symbolic and Imaginary realms, 
stopping short of the “impossibility” of the Real.    
But finally, in his Appendix, Simonis does attempt to envision a site where the 
distinct sciences of morning and evening overlap, a noontime or midnight borderline 
between the two.  This site is the algebraic formula Lévi-Strauss repeatedly used to 
summarize the structure of myth.  Simonis adapts this formula here to describe the 
structure of the Lacanian subject, which would thus comprise the myth of the subject, 
or the subject of myth.11  In Simonis’ adaptation, which he offers here explicitly as the 
hypothetical point of departure for further discussion, the formula means perhaps 
something like: what the mind knows relates to what the body desires as what the body 
knows relates to what desire (unconsciously) thinks.  The split subject, separated from 
itself by a nonrepresentable Real, would be structured as a myth, myth conversely as a 
subject. Indeed, Lévi-Strauss himself proposes in “The Structural Study of Myth”  (Lévi-
Strauss 1963, 206-31) that one apply his formula for myth to precisely the Freudian 
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“family romance of the neurotic”: “This formula becomes highly significant when we 
recall that Freud considered that two traumas (and not one, as is so commonly said) are 
necessary in order to generate the individual myth in which a neurosis consists.  By 
trying to apply the formula to the analysis of these traumas . . . we should not only be 
able to provide a more precise and rigorous formulation of the genetic law of the myth, 
but we would find ourselves in the much desired position of developing side by side the 
anthropological and the psychological aspects of the theory; we might also take it to the 
laboratory and subject it to experimental verification” (228).  Simonis’ Lacanian support 
of Lévi-Strauss’s proposal closes this section of our “Borderlines” Issue concerned 
principally with various versions of the science/nonscience distinction, and with their 
implications for psychoanalysis.     




                                                      
1  The demonstration that such persuasion pervades reason was one of the main thrusts 
of works by Paul de Man such as Aesthetic Ideology.  
2  Not to mention that Galileo, Kepler, Newton, etc., all participate in the explosion of 
medieval cosmology in the seventeenth century (begun already in the sixteenth with 
Copernicus).  On their significance for the modern condition, as one in which a certain 
felt limitlessness is accompanied by an extreme sense of human limitation, see for 
example the magnificent lectures by Alexandre Koyré, From the Closed World to the 
Infinite Universe.  For the significance of Koyré in Lacan’s thinking about “science,” 
see Jean-Claude Milner, L’œuvre claire. 
3  Within the History of Madness, Foucault does discuss, for example, the entirely 
different role of religion in Samuel Tuke’s Quaker reformism, on the one hand, and in 
Philippe Pinel’s more secularist version of psychological reform (482ff, 491ff, and cf. also 
367 and 523ff on religion and morality in relation to madness).  But he does not 
formalize the parallelisms and mutual interferences of these two oppositions—
reason/madness and reason (or science)/religion—which serve as uncanny doubles of 
one another.  For example, if religion at times defensively attempts to preserve a public 
role for itself in modernity by aligning itself with the suppression of irrationality in the 
form of madness (as in Tuke), then madness in turn at times attempts to preserve a 
public role for itself by aligning itself, as autonomous art (e.g. in the several mad artists 
Foucault extols), with the secular suppression of irrationality in the form of religion.  But 
there are many more combinations, which would need to be analyzed in their concrete 
forms in light of the parellelism of the two binary oppositions that here mirror and 
distort each other.    
4  Freud’s earlier, Enlightenment-style approach to religion as “illusion” in The Future of 
an Illusion yields to this tendency to a great extent, whereas his adjustment of this 
position in Civilization and its Discontents does greater “justice” to the complexity of the 
opposition between science and religion.  I have pursued this question further in “The 
Splitting of the Superego in the Process of Self-Consolation: Psychoanalysis Between 
Scientific Facts and Aesthetic Values.”   
5  See Maclear, Oaks, and Sorauf.   
6  I have tried to expose the main theopolitical overdeterminations of the discussion of 
“lay analysis” in “Interpretation of Medicine or Medicine of Interpretation.”   A largely 
untapped goldmine on this topic is K. R. Eissler’s book from 1965, Medical Orthodoxy and 
the Future of Psychoanalysis.   
7  Here, suffice it to note that the tensions with the hospital led to the government 
authorities’ worries—ultimately proven to be unfounded—about GIFRIC’s economic 
dimension.  This symptomatic anxiety about excess (jouissance) issued, however, in the 
collusion between individuals in the hospital direction and in the press, leading to the 
publication of fraudulent and libelous reports about the Center, which were ultimately 
prosecuted, as GIFRIC was granted the right to continue to run the Center 
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independently of the hospital in accordance with its articulated principles and successful 
experiences in the past.   
8  Dany Nobus shows usefully how Lacan attempts to defend or re-assert the 
scientificity of psychoanalysis, but at a distance from realisms and empiricisms, and by 
following first the structuralist and then the mathematical, topological model.   
9  In this respect, Apollon and his colleagues are more in sync with Foucault (and 
Deleuze and De Certeau) than with Derrida, although they diverge from Foucault and 
Deleuze in taking Lacan more emphatically as their point of departure and continuing 
reference, especially the Lacanian theory of psychosis as sketched in “On a Question 
Preliminary to any Possible Treatment of Psychosis” (Écrits  445-88), the position 
developed in oral form in the Seminar III on The Psychoses (from 1955-56).  The 
Psychoanalytic Center for the Treatment of Psychoses is a concretization and realization 
of that theory, as supplemented and altered in many specific ways, notably by the 
addition of local kinship studies to trace the symbolic order involved in psychotic and 
nonpsychotic subjects, and by further elaborations on the notions of jouissance and the 
object a.   
10  The contemporary philosophy of psychology can perhaps be said to refer to the 
“mother tongue” implicitly when it speaks of “folk psychology” and makes the project 
for a scientific psychology the perfection (or rejection) of this “folk psychology” by 
means of its comparison with various frameworks laying claim to scientificity.  
“Contemporary . . . philosophy of psychology represents two ways of assessing the 
scientific status of this folk theory.  The first way compares the systematic explanatory 
power of folk psychology to that of more developed nonpsychological sciences.  The 
second way examines successful areas of professional psychology and compares the 
theoretical kinds (e.g. states, processes, events, and properties) of that putative scientific 
psychology to those (e.g. belief, desire, fear, hope, etc.) mentioned in folk psychological 
generalizations ” (J. D. Trout, 605).   
11  For the discussion about this formula in Lévi-Strauss’s works, see the wonderful 
recent collection of essays edited by Pierre Maranda, The Double Twist.   See also Mark S. 
Mosko and E.K. Maranda and Pierre Maranda, Structural Models in Folklore and 
Transformational Essays.   
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